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In this paper, I focus on the alleged distinction between speaker’s refer-
ence and semantic reference. I begin by discussing Saul Kripke’s notion 
of speaker’s reference and the theoretical roles it is supposed to play, ar-
guing that they do not justify the claim that reference comes in two differ-
ent sorts and highlighting that Kripke’s own defi nition makes the notion 
incompatible with the nowadays widely endorsed Gricean project, which 
aims at explaining semantic reference in terms of speaker’s reference. I 
then examine an alternative account of speaker’s reference offered by Mi-
chael Devitt within his causal theory and express some doubts about its 
suitability for explaining proper name semantic reference. From all this, 
I conclude that there is at least some tension between Kripke’s chain of 
communication picture and the attempt to explain (Griceanly, so to say) 
semantic properties in terms of speakers’ mental states.
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1. Introduction
Does the mind of the speaker play any role in determining the refer-
ence of the proper name tokens he or she produces?1 For most of the 
philosophers who subscribe to what Keith Donnellan (1970) called “the 
1 I fi rst raised this question in Bianchi 2012, to contrast two ways of being 
referentialist, and more generally two models of the functioning of language, which 
I then called the psychological model and the social model. (I now prefer to call the 
latter the linguistic model, since it is based on highlighting the (semantic) autonomy 
of language from users, which is something that may in principle obtain, pace 
Wittgenstein, even if there is a single user and no social relation at work.)
424 A. Bianchi, Speaker’s Reference and the Gricean Project
principle of identifying descriptions,” it does.2 According to them, in 
fact, in order to refer with a proper name, the speaker must attach (in 
his or her mind, so to say) a set of identifying descriptions to it, and the 
referent of the token he or she produces, if there is one, is “that object 
that uniquely fi ts a ‘suffi cient’ number of the descriptions in the set” 
(Donnellan 1970: 339). If the speaker attached a different set of identi-
fying descriptions to the name, the produced token might refer to some-
thing else. Therefore, the reference of the token does crucially depend 
on the mental state of its producer, in this view. Basically, by using a 
proper name the speaker would be referring to something because he 
or she would be thinking of it through a set of identifying descriptions.
However, the principle of identifying descriptions is not very fash-
ionable nowadays, and for quite good reasons. In fact, devastating criti-
cisms to any approach to proper names based on it were offered around 
1970 by Donnellan himself as well as, of course, Saul Kripke. As a con-
sequence, various philosophers of language, developing suggestions 
from the work of both Kripke and Donnellan, began to advocate histori-
cal, if not altogether causal, accounts of proper name reference. Since 
these accounts highlight the crucial role played in determining refer-
ence by worldly historical facts that may be unknown to the speaker 
(as David Kaplan wrote, “[t]he notion of a historical chain … [offers] 
an alternative explanation of how a name in local use can be connected 
with a remote referent, an explanation that does not require that the 
mechanism of reference is already in the head of the local user in the 
form of a self-assigned description” (1989: 602–3)), one may be led to 
believe that the answer to our initial question must be negative: the 
mind of the speaker does not play any role in determining the reference 
of the proper name tokens he or she produces. Indeed, Kaplan himself 
seems to have been at least tempted by this idea, when, in contrasting 
“the subjectivist views of Frege and Russell” (603) with “the view that 
we are, for the most part, language consumers” (602)—in his terms, 
subjectivist semantics with consumerist semantics—he urged us to “see 
language, and in particular semantics, as more autonomous, more in-
dependent of the thought of individual users” (603–4). Some other phi-
losophers followed suit.3 And I should add that my own attempt to use 
Kaplan’s (1990) notion of repetition to develop Kripke’s chain of com-
munication picture into a full-blown theory of proper name reference 
(Bianchi 2015) also goes in this direction.
2 Actually, aiming at generality, Donnellan formulated the principle so as to 
“leave it open … whether the set of identifying descriptions is to be formed from 
what each speaker can supply or from what speakers collectively supply” (339), and 
the second alternative seems to allow for a negative answer to the question in the 
text. Indeed, as I noted in Bianchi 2012: 84, the position combining descriptivism 
and (semantic) anti-subjectivism is not inconsistent. But it is indisputable, I believe, 
that what drives most of the descriptivists is the idea that the speaker must have 
epistemic control on what he or she refers to.
3 See especially Wettstein 2004, Hinchliff 2012, and Martí 2015.
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Thus, I certainly do not believe that the mind of the speaker plays 
any role in determining the reference of the proper name tokens he or 
she produces. But, unfortunately, things are not as clear as it may ap-
pear, even if one takes the road opened up by the revolutionary work of 
Kripke and Donnellan. On the one hand, Donnellan himself seems to 
have thought otherwise, since he made reference crucially depend on 
having in mind. As a matter of fact, for a long time Donnellan’s “his-
torical explanation theory” was obscured by Kripke’s chain of commu-
nication picture, to which it was wrongly assimilated.4 As of recently, 
however, a group of philosophers, related in one way or another with 
UCLA, where Donnellan taught for many years, have rediscovered, de-
veloped, and radicalized his ideas on reference, determining something 
like a Donnellan Renaissance in the fi eld.5 On the other hand, a num-
ber of other philosophers have found a different, subtler, way to fi nd 
a place for the speaker’s mind in the theory of reference, by appealing 
instead to the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic ref-
erence introduced in the debate by Kripke to argue against Donnellan’s 
account of defi nite descriptions, and interpreting it so as to endorse 
what I shall call the Gricean project.
I have dealt with Donnellan’s and the neo-Donnellanians’ account of 
reference elsewhere and shall not say any more about it here.6 My aim 
in this paper is instead to examine and criticize the second approach. 
In particular, I shall focus on Michael Devitt’s version of it. In so doing, 
I shall continue an ongoing debate with Devitt himself, on his causal 
theory of proper names and the nature of reference (see Devitt 2015, 
Bianchi forthcoming, and Devitt forthcoming a for the previous stages). 
I shall proceed as follows. I shall present and discuss Kripke’s distinc-
tion and the particular interpretation of it that amounts to endorsing 
the Gricean project in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 4, I shall examine 
Devitt’s causal theory of proper names, paying special attention to its 
relation to the project. Finally, I shall draw some general conclusions 
in Section 5.
2. Kripke’s distinction
As far as I know, the distinction between speaker’s reference and se-
mantic reference makes its fi rst appearance in the literature, quite 
incidentally, near the beginning of “Naming and Necessity”.7 Before 
elaborating on “the relation between names and descriptions,” Kripke 
says the following:
4 See Bianchi and Bonanini 2014 for a detailed reconstruction of Donnellan’s 
historical explanation theory of proper name reference that contrasts it with 
Kripke’s picture.
5 See in particular Almog 2012 and 2014: chap. 3, Capuano 2012 and 2018, Pepp 
2012 and 2019, Almog, Nichols and Pepp 2015, and Wulfemeyer 2017.
6 See my “Reference and Language,” forthcoming.
7 See however Geach 1962: 31–2 for an earlier hint at the distinction.
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It is a point, made by Donnellan, that under certain circumstances a par-
ticular speaker may use a defi nite description to refer, not to the proper ref-
erent … of that description, but to something else which he wants to single 
out and which he thinks is the proper referent of the description, but which 
in fact isn’t. So, you may say “The man over there with the champagne in his 
glass is happy”, though he actually only has water in his glass. Now, even 
though there is no champagne in his glass, and there may be another man 
in the room who does have champagne in his glass, the speaker intended to 
refer, or maybe, in some sense of ‘refer’, did refer, to the man he thought 
had the champagne in his glass. Nevertheless I’m just going to use the term 
‘referent of the description’ to mean the object uniquely satisfying the condi-
tions in the defi nite description. (1972: 254 (1980: 25–6))
Kripke is pausing here on a common phenomenon: sometimes we in-
tend to refer to something to which we do not actually refer.8 As in many 
other cases (think of the intention to help, or kill, or email, someone, for 
example), not always are our intentions successful—perhaps we do not 
choose the right means, or the environment does not ‘cooperate,’ or … 
That’s life, one would say. But then, Kripke makes a surprising move 
and states, although cautiously (notice the “maybe”), that there is a 
sense of “refer” according to which even in this case we may say that we 
referred to what we did not actually refer to, in the fi rst, primary, sense. 
This is strange. Take the case of emailing and intending to email, and 
assume, to make it even more similar to the one under discussion, that 
a intends to email b but fails and ends up emailing c instead. Here, 
certainly we are not inclined to say that although a emailed c in the 
fi rst, primary, sense of “email,” b was also emailed by a, in another 
sense of “email”—“emailing” does not seem to be ambiguous. Thus, why 
should we instead take “referring” as ambiguous? I shall come back to 
this in the next Section. As for now, let me only note that, ironically, it 
is Kripke himself, and furthermore in the same article where he elabo-
rates on the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic ref-
erence, who provides us with reasons for being suspicious:
It is very much the lazy man’s approach in philosophy to posit ambigui-
ties when in trouble. If we face a putative counterexample to our favourite 
philosophical thesis, it is always open to us to protest that some key term 
is being used in a special sense, different from its use in the thesis. We may 
be right, but the ease of the move should counsel a policy of caution: Do not 
posit an ambiguity unless you are really forced to, unless there are really 
compelling theoretical or intuitive grounds to suppose that an ambiguity 
really is present. (1977: 268)
As we have just seen, in “Naming and Necessity” Kripke introduces 
the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference 
with an example involving a defi nite description, and defi nite descrip-
tions are not the topic of this paper. However, in a footnote appended 
to the above passage, Kripke adds:
8 Although I am uncomfortable with saying that a defi nite description refers to 
its denotatum, I shall follow Kripke’s usage here.
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Donnellan’s distinction seems applicable to names as well as descriptions. 
Two men glimpse someone at a distance and think they recognize him as 
Jones. ‘What is Jones doing?’ ‘Raking the leaves’. If the distant leaf-raker is 
actually Smith, then in some sense they are referring to Smith, even though 
they both use ‘Jones’ as a name of Jones.... I speak of the ‘referent’ of a name 
to mean the thing named by the name—e.g., Jones, not Smith—even though 
a speaker may sometimes properly be said to use the name to refer to some-
one else…. I am tentatively inclined to believe, in opposition to Donnellan, 
that his remarks about reference have little to do with semantics or truth-
conditions, though they may be relevant to a theory of speech-acts. Space 
limitations do not permit me to explain what I mean by this, much less 
defend the view, except for a brief remark: Call the referent of a name or 
description in my sense the ‘semantic referent’; for a name, this is the thing 
named, for a description, the thing uniquely satisfying the description.
Then the speaker may refer to something other than the semantic referent 
if he has appropriate false beliefs. I think this is what happens in the nam-
ing (Smith-Jones) cases and also in the Donnellan ‘champagne’ case; the one 
requires no theory that names are ambiguous, and the other requires no 
modifi cation of Russell’s theory of descriptions. (1972: 343 n. 3 (1980: 25n))
After these brief and incidental remarks, there is no more mention 
of speaker’s reference in “Naming and Necessity”. In fact, for our pur-
poses here it is important to keep in mind that the chain of communi-
cation picture offered by Kripke in his second lecture concerns (proper 
name) semantic reference, not at all speaker’s reference.
As is well known, in his 1977 article Kripke develops these remarks 
and makes the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic 
reference his main weapon for arguing against the semantic signifi -
cance of Donnellan’s (1966) distinction between attributive and refer-
ential uses of defi nite descriptions. In fact, according to Kripke, Donnel-
lan confused what a speaker refers to, by using a defi nite description, 
with what the description he or she uses refers to, on that occasion. 
Consider Leonard Linsky’s famous example. While it is certain that 
the speaker who utters “Her husband is kind to her” after observing the 
attitude of a man towards a woman refers to the man, who, however, 
is not her husband but, let us suppose, her lover, one may (and should, 
as Kripke then argues on methodological grounds) doubt that the de-
scription he uses semantically refers, on that occasion, to that person 
rather than to nobody (as in Linsky’s original case, where the woman 
is a spinster) or to her husband (as in Kripke’s modifi ed version, where 
she is married to a cruel man). In fact, Kripke goes on, the distinction 
Donnellan seems to have overlooked applies to other referential terms 
as well—arguably to all, although Kripke does not mention indexicals 
and demonstratives. In particular, Kripke discusses the case we have 
already encountered in the footnote from “Naming and Necessity”:
Two people see Smith in the distance and mistake him for Jones. They have 
a brief colloquy: “What is Jones doing?” “Raking the leaves.” “Jones,” in the 
common language of both, is a name of Jones; it never names Smith. Yet, in 
some sense, on this occasion, clearly both participants in the dialogue have 
referred to Smith. (1977: 263)
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Here, according to Kripke, one may agree that, by using “Jones,” the 
two people refer to Smith.9 But it is certainly beyond dispute that what 
the name they use refers to on that occasion is Jones (in their common 
language, it is a name of him!). All in all, then, it seems as if for every 
use of a (non-empty) proper name or a (proper) defi nite description, i.e., 
for every token of them, we need to distinguish two important relations 
it bears to individuals, speaker’s reference and semantic reference, and 
in some cases the individual a token is related to by the fi rst relation 
differs from the individual that very token is related to by the second.10
Unlike in “Naming and Necessity”, in the 1977 article the distinc-
tion between speaker’s reference and semantic reference is introduced 
by means of theoretical considerations, and as part of a “general ap-
paratus.” In fact, Kripke’s alleged starting point is now Paul Grice’s 
approach to meaning: “[f]irst, let us distinguish, following Grice, be-
tween what the speaker’s words meant, on a given occasion, and what 
he meant, in saying these words, on that occasion” (262). After discuss-
ing some examples, he sums up:
The notion of what words can mean, in the language, is semantical: it is 
given by the conventions of our language. What they mean, on a given occa-
sion, is determined, on a given occasion, by these conventions, together with 
the intentions of the speaker and various contextual features. Finally what 
the speaker meant, on a given occasion, in saying certain words, derives 
from various further special intentions of the speaker, together with various 
general principles, applicable to all human languages regardless of their 
special conventions. (Cf. Grice’s “conversational maxims.”) (263)
Only at this point does Kripke introduce his distinction. According to 
him, in fact, speaker’s reference and semantic reference “are special 
cases of [these] Gricean notions” (263). I shall postpone the discussion 
of this claim to the next Section.
Concerning semantic reference, in the article Kripke does not say 
much. His characterization of it is the following:
If a speaker has a designator in his idiolect, certain conventions of his id-
iolect (given various facts about the world) determine the referent in the 
idiolect: that I call the semantic referent of the designator. (If the designator 
is ambiguous, or contains indexicals, demonstratives, or the like, we must 
speak of the semantic referent on a given occasion. The referent will be de-
termined by the conventions of the language plus the speaker’s intentions 
9 Note, however, that, as Devitt remarked a long time ago (1981a: 514–5), 
concerning this case intuitions are much less clear than concerning Linsky’s. 
Perhaps, following Devitt, one should rather say that by that use the two people 
refer partially to Jones and partially to Smith. I shall not take a stand on this here. 
(On this issue, see also footnote 13 and Section 4 below.)
10 As a matter of fact, Kripke’s speaker’s reference is not a binary relation between 
a token and an object but a ternary relation between a speaker, a use of a designator 
and an object. However, from it a binary relation may easily be defi ned along the 
following lines: a token of a designator speaker-refers to an object if and only if the 
speaker who produces the former refers to the latter by using the designator on that 
occasion.
 A. Bianchi, Speaker’s Reference and the Gricean Project 429
and various contextual features.) (263)
Coming from Kripke, this appeal to idiolects is somewhat surprising, 
but it is probably due to his willingness to remain neutral about se-
mantic matters when outlining the distinction between semantic refer-
ence and speaker’s reference—one has to acknowledge the distinction, 
whatever his or her semantic theory. In fact, in a footnote appended 
to the passage, Kripke adds: “If the views about proper names I have 
advocated in ‘Naming and Necessity’ are correct ... the conventions re-
garding names in an idiolect usually involve the fact that the idiolect 
is no mere idiolect, but part of a common language, in which reference 
may be passed from link to link” (273 n. 20). Indeed, if those views are 
correct, as I shall assume throughout the paper, semantic reference, 
at least as far as proper names are concerned, is a historical matter. 
As I have already mentioned, I have tried to develop Kripke’s chain of 
communication picture into a full-blown theory elsewhere, and I shall 
not say anything more about semantic reference here except for this 
brief remark: in the above characterization, Kripke explicitly mentions 
speaker’s intentions but only to deal with ambiguity and indexicality. 
As a matter of fact, I believe Kripke is wrong in claiming that to deal 
with these linguistic phenomena we need to appeal to intentions, but 
I shall not argue in favor of this here. However, what I would like to 
be noticed is that, except when ambiguity or indexicality is involved, 
Kripke himself does not seem to think that speaker’s intentions play 
any role in determining semantic reference (unless the notion of con-
vention invoked in his characterization needs to be explained in terms 
of them, which I do not think is the case if the chain of communication 
picture is on the right track).11
Let us now move on to speaker’s reference. Kripke begins with some 
words of caution, stating that “[s]peaker’s reference is a more diffi cult 
notion” (263). This is already interesting, given that it contrasts with a 
certain attitude some philosophers have towards the notion (as if, con-
trary perhaps to semantic reference, speaker’s reference were easy to 
characterize). Then, he presents the Smith-Jones case we have already 
encountered and asks how we can account for it. Here is his answer:
Suppose a speaker takes it that a certain object a fulfi lls the conditions 
for being the semantic referent of a designator, “d.” Then, wishing to say 
something about a, he uses “d” to speak about a; say, he says “ϕ(d).” Then, 
he said, of a, on that occasion, that it ϕ’d; in the appropriate Gricean sense 
..., he meant that a ϕ’d. This is true even if a is not really the semantic refer-
ent of “d.” If it is not, then that a ϕ’s is included in what he meant (on that 
occasion), but not in the meaning of his words (on that occasion). (263–4)
From this, Kripke arrives at his defi nition of speaker’s reference:
11 Actually, this is not completely true, since a few lines after characterizing 
semantic reference Kripke writes that “[i]n a given idiolect, the semantic referent 
of a designator (without indexicals) is given by a general intention of the speaker 
to refer to a certain object whenever the designator is used” (264). However, I think 
that this appeal to general intentions may easily be dispensed with.
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we may tentatively defi ne the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that 
object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and 
believes fulfi lls the conditions for being the semantic referent of the des-
ignator. He uses the designator with the intention of making an assertion 
about the object in question (which may not really be the semantic referent, 
if the speaker’s belief that it fulfi lls the appropriate semantic conditions 
is in error). The speaker’s referent is the thing the speaker referred to by 
the designator, though it may not be the referent of the designator, in his 
idiolect. (264)
So, it seems that, for there to be speaker’s reference, there has to 
be, (1), a speaker’s use of a designator to assert something (but, I as-
sume, any other illocutionary act would do as well), backed by, (2), his 
or her wish to talk about a particular object, and, (3), his or her belief 
about that particular object that it is the semantic referent of the des-
ignator.12 More precisely, a speaker a refers to an individual b by using 
a designator c if and only if, (1), a wishes to talk about b, and, (2), a 
believes of b that it is the semantic referent of c, and, (3), a produces a 
token of c in the course of accomplishing an illocutionary act.13
Is this a good defi nition? I have some qualms concerning the fi rst 
clause, because it is not clear to me what wishing to talk about consists 
in exactly. However, for the sake of the argument I shall simply assume 
that a broadly causal account will work here: what someone wishes to 
talk about when he or she accomplishes an illocutionary act is what-
ever object prompts his or her act—though, obviously, much more than 
this would need to be said. The third clause is trivial. We shall pause 
on the second clause, which makes a’s referring to b by using c depend 
on a’s believing of b that it is the semantic referent of c, in the next Sec-
tion. However, there is no doubt that it is intelligible. So, if we ignore 
the qualms concerning wishing to talk about, we may conclude that 
Kripke’s notion of speaker’s reference is well defi ned: we know what 
has to be the case for there to be what he calls “speaker’s reference.”
12 As a matter of fact, Kripke is aware that some of the cases discussed by 
Donnellan (for example, that of “the king” used to refer to someone known to be the 
usurper) do not involve such a belief. He takes them to be “of a somewhat exceptional 
kind” and writes: “Largely for the sake of simplicity of exposition, I have excluded 
such ... from the notion of speaker’s reference .... I do not think that the situation 
would be materially altered if [the notion] were revised so as to admit these cases, in 
a more refi ned analysis” (273 n. 22). I shall go along with Kripke’s assumption here. 
Probably, to deal with these cases, the analysis would have to invoke even more 
sophisticated beliefs.
13 By the way, let me note that, according to Kripke’s defi nition, we should say 
that in the Smith-Jones case by using “Jones” the two speakers refer not only to 
Smith but also to Jones (see footnote 9 above). In fact, they certainly wish to talk 
about Jones (if not, why would they use “Jones”?) and of course believe of him that he 
is the semantic referent of “Jones.” Actually, Kripke himself seems to acknowledge 
this (274–5 n. 28).
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3. The Gricean project
At the beginning of his article, Kripke writes that he believes that the 
“contrast” between speaker’s reference and semantic reference “is of 
considerable constructive as well as critical importance to the philoso-
phy of language” (255). At the very end of the article, the claim is reiter-
ated in more or less the same words.
Actually, Kripke’s distinction has been enormously successful. 
Nowadays, talk of speaker’s reference beyond semantic reference is 
widespread among philosophers of language. In fact, almost all of them 
are now convinced that reference comes in two different sorts:14 there 
is semantic reference, which contributes to determine the semantic 
properties of the linguistic expressions we use, and speaker’s reference, 
which contributes to determine other, pragmatic, properties of them 
and which a theory of speech acts should pay attention to.
Notice that this already muddies the waters concerning our initial 
question, which, if Kripke is right, turns out to be ambiguous: it can 
concern the determination either of the semantic reference or of the 
speaker’s reference of a proper name token. And, if it concerns the 
determination of the latter, the answer cannot but be positive: given 
how speaker’s reference depends on the speaker’s wishes and beliefs, 
of course the mind of the speaker does play a substantial role in deter-
mining the speaker’s reference of the proper name tokens he or she pro-
duces. But things can become even worse, since if Kripke’s distinction 
is interpreted so as to endorse the Gricean project, a move we are about 
to discuss, even semantic reference ends up being ‘mind-contaminated,’ 
contrary to what I take to be one of the main lessons of Kripke’s chain 
of communication picture.
But, are we really forced to assume that reference comes in two dif-
ferent sorts?
To begin with, let me note that the fact that the notion of speaker’s 
reference introduced by Kripke is well defi ned does not settle the is-
sue yet. To see this, consider the following case. Micky wishes to go to 
Bologna and believes that train 2286 goes there. Hence, she takes that 
train. Unfortunately, her belief is false: train 2286 goes in the opposite 
direction, to Milan. This can happen, especially to a person as inatten-
tive as Micky. We know how to describe the situation: Micky intended 
to go to Bologna but, because of her inattention (and, more specifi cally, 
of her false belief about train 2286), she chose the wrong means and 
ended up going to Milan. But now, suppose that someone introduces 
the notion of, say, traveler’s going, defi ning it in the following way: a 
traveler a goes to a place b by taking a train c if and only if, (1), a 
wishes to go to b, and, (2), a believes of b that it is where c goes, and, 
(3), a takes c for his or her journey. Undoubtedly, the notion is well de-
14 A notable exception is constituted by the neo-Donnellanians (see the works 
mentioned in footnote 5 above). Although I strongly disagree with their account of 
reference, I am sympathetic to their ‘unitary’ approach to it. 
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fi ned: we know what has to be case for there to be what our introducer 
calls “traveler’s going.” In particular, according to it we may say that 
by taking train 2286 Micky went to Bologna, although of course accord-
ing to another, perhaps primary and certainly more standard, sense of 
“going,” by taking that train she went to Milan, because Milan is where 
the train went. It is even possible that the notion thus defi ned helps 
explain some of the traveler’s (e.g., Micky’s) actions. But I assume that 
everyone would regard it as absurd to conclude from this that going (to 
a place) comes in two different sorts: intending to go somewhere and 
failing to do so does not amount to going there according to some other 
sense of “going.” By parity of reasoning, we should not be too hasty 
to conclude that reference comes in two different sorts only because 
Kripke’s notion of speaker’s reference is well defi ned, since the notion 
of traveler’s going is also well defi ned, and along similar lines.
To establish whether reference really comes in two different sorts, 
then, we need to go beyond Kripke’s defi nition. The only reasonable 
strategy, it seems to me, is to consider the theoretical roles the notion 
so defi ned is supposed to play, to see, (1), whether it can really play 
these roles, and, (2), if indeed it can play them, whether the fact that it 
can justifi es the claim that speaker’s reference is some sort of reference 
(in contrast, to repeat, to traveler’s going, which no one would take to 
be any sort of going).
Well, what are the theoretical roles that Kripke’s notion is supposed 
to play? From what Kripke writes at the beginning of his article (see 
above) we may infer that he takes the notion to have both a critical and 
a constructive use. We need, then, to consider the two of them.
Kripke’s article is almost entirely devoted to the critical use of the 
notion of speaker’s reference and of the ensuing distinction. As Kripke 
makes explicit in the last paragraph of it, in fact, the latter can play an 
important role “as a critical tool to block postulation of unwarranted 
ambiguities” (271). We have already seen in the preceding Section how 
this tool basically works. Consider the Smith-Jones example again, and 
suppose that, impressed by the two speakers’ dialogue, some theorists 
claim that, in both speakers’ idiolect, the name “Jones,” which they 
are using, is semantically ambiguous: it habitually refers to Jones, but 
in the context of the dialogue to Smith.15 Against them, it can be ob-
jected that they are confusing what the speakers are referring to, on 
that occasion, with what the name the speakers use refers to, on that 
and other occasions: the claim that “Jones” is semantically ambiguous 
(in the sense just specifi ed) seems to be unwarranted. Of course, the 
case of defi nite descriptions is the one Kripke is mostly interested in. 
Consider Linsky’s example again. It is reasonable to interpret Don-
nellan (1966) as claiming that the description “her husband,” which 
15 By the way, let me note that the neo-Donnellanians tend to make similar 
claims (see e.g. Almog, Nichols and Pepp 2015: 368–74 and Capuano 2018). Of 
course, they know well about Kripke’s “critical tool,” but they are unimpressed by it.
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the speaker uses, is semantically ambiguous: it often refers to some-
one who is the husband of the contextually salient woman, but in the 
context depicted by Linsky to a man who is not in fact her husband. 
Against Donnellan, Kripke objects that he confuses what the speaker 
refers to, on that occasion, with what the description the speaker uses 
refers to, on that occasion, who is, as for any other use of it, the hus-
band of the contextually salient woman (if there is any): the claim that 
“her husband” is semantically ambiguous (in the sense just specifi ed), 
Kripke concludes, is unwarranted.
As I have already made clear, defi nite descriptions are not the topic 
of this paper, and this is certainly not the place to evaluate Kripke’s 
argument. Thus, concerning this I limit myself to saying that I believe 
Kripke’s considerations indeed have some bite against Donnellan’s 
views, although by themselves they do not suffi ce to settle the issue 
concerning the semantics of defi nite descriptions (as, I hasten to add, 
Kripke himself is ready to admit).16 What is important to notice for our 
purposes, however, is that even if the argument succeeds, its success 
does not essentially depend on there being another sort of reference 
beyond semantic reference. To block postulation of unwarranted am-
biguities, in fact, we do not need the critical tool Kripke introduced, 
although its introduction may have been helpful from a rhetorical point 
of view. We can get exactly the same results by arguing that in the 
critical cases, be they the Smith-Jones one or Linsky’s, the postula-
tor confuses what the speaker intended to refer to, on that occasion, 
with what the speaker actually referred to, on that occasion (which is 
determined by the semantic properties of the designator the speaker 
uses). The distinction we need is the simple and commonsensical one 
between intending to do something and doing something, as applied 
to reference. The notion of speaker’s reference is, then, an idle wheel 
here. Worse than that, it can mislead, and has actually misled, people, 
since it invites one to obliterate the obvious and important difference 
between successful and unsuccessful intentions, namely that when our 
intention is successful, we end up doing what we intended; when it 
isn’t, we fail to do what we intended. Let me emphasize the point: failed 
reference to something is no reference to it.
Well, but what about the constructive use of the notion of speaker’s 
reference and of the ensuing distinction? Doesn’t it vindicate the claim 
that reference comes in two different sorts? Unfortunately, concerning 
it Kripke says almost nothing. In fact, he limits himself to touching on 
the issue in the very fi nal passage of his article, which is now fi nally 
time to quote in its entirety:
I think that the distinction between semantic reference and speaker’s refer-
ence will be of importance not only (as in the present paper) as a critical tool 
to block postulation of unwarranted ambiguities, but also will be of consid-
16 For some criticisms of Kripke’s argument, see for example Devitt 1981a and 
Devitt 2004.
434 A. Bianchi, Speaker’s Reference and the Gricean Project
erable constructive importance for a theory of language. In particular, I fi nd 
it plausible that a diachronic account of the evolution of language is likely 
to suggest that what was originally a mere speaker’s reference may, if it be-
comes habitual in a community, evolve into a semantic reference. And this 
consideration may be one of the factors needed to clear up some puzzles in 
the theory of reference. (1977: 271)
Thus, Kripke thinks that to explain the evolution of language, and 
more specifi cally the establishment of a semantic relation of reference 
between a designator and an object, we can profi tably use the notion of 
speaker’s reference.
The claim seems to me to be open to two interpretations, one moder-
ate, the other radical. The moderate one, which, for reasons that will 
become clear at the end of this Section, I assume to be the one Kripke 
had in mind, sees speaker’s reference as being involved in the puzzling 
phenomenon of (semantic) reference change, on which Gareth Evans 
(1973: 11) famously put his fi nger when arguing against what he called 
“the Causal Theory of Names.” Kripke himself, in fact, mentions Evans’ 
Madagascar case in a footnote appended to the last sentence of the 
passage just quoted. And Kripke’s idea that we can profi tably use the 
notion of speaker’s reference to clear up the puzzle has actually been 
exploited and developed by Devitt (1981b: 150–1; 2015: 121–4), who 
argues that reference change is explained by “change in the pattern 
of groundings” (2015: 122). Now, I actually have some qualms about 
Kripke’s idea and Devitt’s development—I still fi nd the puzzle puzzling 
(see Bianchi 2015: 104–6)—but even if we concede that the solution 
works, it does not seem to me that this provides good enough reasons 
to claim that reference comes in two different sorts. Exactly the same 
kind of explanation, in fact, can be obtained by appealing to massive 
reference failure (reference failure that “becomes habitual in a com-
munity”, to use Kripke’s phrase), which somehow determines the es-
tablishment of a new semantic relation.17 Speaker’s reference is an idle 
wheel here as well, in my opinion.
However, as I have said there is a more radical interpretation of 
Kripke’s claim. According to this, the notion of speaker’s reference is 
useful for explaining not only (semantic) reference change, but seman-
tic reference tout court. In a nutshell: there could not be semantic refer-
ence if there were not speaker’s reference. This interpretation of Kripke’s 
claim, and more generally of his distinction, amounts to endorsing 
what I have called the Gricean project, by seeing speaker’s reference as 
explanatorily basic with respect to semantic reference.
17 To avoid misunderstanding, let me make it clear that I am using “reference 
failure” here to talk not, as is more common, of cases where no reference is in fact 
made, but of cases where reference is made to something that is not what the speaker 
intended to refer to. In these cases, the speaker intends to refer to something (e.g., 
Smith, or the great African island) but fails and refers to something else instead 
(respectively, Jones and a portion of the African mainland).
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We have seen in Section 2 that, to introduce his distinction, in his 
1977 article Kripke appeals to Grice’s work on meaning. In particular, 
Kripke mentions Grice’s distinction “between what the speaker’s words 
meant, on a given occasion, and what he meant, in saying these words, 
on that occasion” and claims that the notions of semantic reference and 
speaker’s reference are just “special cases” of Grice’s ones. The fact is, 
however, that one stage in Grice’s general program concerning mean-
ing was the explanation of word (and sentence) meaning in terms of 
utterer’s meaning, the other stage being of course that of explaining 
the latter in terms of intentions.18 As is often the case, the details of 
Grice’s proposal varied over the years, but fortunately we do not need 
to pause on them for our purposes. On the explanatory priority of ut-
terer’s meaning over word and sentence meaning, however, Grice was 
always crystal clear. In his very fi rst article on the topic, for example, 
he concludes his criticism of a causal account of meaning, which he at-
tributes to C. L. Stevenson (not to be confused with Devitt’s later and 
quite different causal theory of proper names that we shall examine in 
the next Section) by saying that “the causal theory ignores the fact that 
the meaning (in general) of a sign needs to be explained in terms of 
what users of the sign do (or should) mean by it on particular occasions; 
and so the latter notion, which is unexplained by the causal theory, is 
in fact the fundamental one” (1957: 217). And twenty-fi ve years later, 
in his late revisiting of these issues, he writes:
It seems plausible to suppose that to say that a sentence (word, expression) 
means something (to say that “John is a bachelor” means that John is an 
unmarried male, or whatever it is) is to be somehow understood in terms of 
what particular users of that sentence (word, expression) mean on particu-
lar occasions. The fi rst possible construal of this is rather crude: namely, 
that usually people do use this sentence, etc., in this way. A construal which 
seems to me rather better is that it is conventional to use this sentence in 
this way; and there are many others. (1982: 298)19
It is certainly not within the scope of this paper to evaluate Grice’s 
claim concerning the explanatory priority of utterer’s meaning over 
18 The fi rst stage, which is the one I am interested in here, is discussed at 
length in Grice 1968. Summing up that article in a following one devoted to the 
second stage instead, Grice writes: “Starting with the assumption that the notion 
of an utterer’s occasion-meaning can be explicated, in a certain way, in terms of 
an utterer’s intentions, I argue in support of the thesis that timeless meaning 
and applied timeless meaning can be explicated in terms of the notion of utterer’s 
occasion-meaning (together with other notions), and so ultimately in terms of the 
notion of intention” (1969: 150).
19 Interestingly, in the immediately following paragraph Grice adds: “I do 
not think that [sentence (word, expression)] meaning is essentially connected 
with convention. What it is essentially connected with is some way of fi xing what 
sentences mean: convention is indeed one of these ways, but it is not the only one. I 
can invent a language, call it Deutero-Esperanto, which nobody ever speaks. That 
makes me the authority, and I can lay down what is proper” (298–9). Thus, contra 
Devitt (see the next Section), Grice believes that there can be word meaning (i.e, a 
word can have semantic properties) even in the absence of conventions.
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word or sentence meaning, even less his entire program concerning 
meaning, although what I am saying may have some bearing on it.20 
My focus here is rather what I have called the Gricean project, the re-
lated claim that speaker’s reference is explanatorily prior to semantic 
reference, a claim that we have seen emerge from a radical interpreta-
tion of Kripke’s passage about the “constructive” use of his distinction. 
This, in fact, has an obvious impact on the issues we are interested 
in. First, if the claim were true, semantic reference would depend on 
a more basic relation, which it would be diffi cult not to consider as a 
form of reference, hence we would be almost forced to fi nally acknowl-
edge that reference comes in two different sorts. Second, since, as we 
have seen, speaker’s reference in turn depends on wishes and beliefs, 
we would have to give a positive answer to our initial question (and, 
more generally, adopt a psychological model of the functioning of lan-
guage): the mind of the speaker would play a role in determining both 
the speaker’s reference (directly, so to say) and the semantic reference 
(more indirectly, via the explanatory dependence of semantic reference 
on speaker’s reference) of the proper name tokens he or she produces.
Now, many philosophers of language who would describe them-
selves as having a broadly speaking Kripkean approach to reference do 
indeed endorse, either explicitly or implicitly, the Gricean project. In 
the next Section, I shall discuss Devitt’s case, whose causal theory con-
stitutes a detailed account of speaker’s reference, semantic reference, 
and the explanatory dependence of the latter on the former. To give 
only one further example, in a recent article Mark Sainsbury defended 
the claim that “[a]lthough reference is often transmitted causally, what 
determines semantic reference is conventionalized speaker-reference” 
(2015: 195), in the following way:
The “semantic reference” of a name, as used in a community, is its conven-
tionalized, stabilized or normalized speaker-reference in the community. 
“London” refers to London among many speakers who live in England (and 
elsewhere) because it’s a conventional or stabilized or normal fact about 
these speakers that they use the specifi c name “London” … only if they 
intend thereby to refer to London. The notion of semantic reference is a 
theoretical one, and one that needs to be constructed to suit theoretical 
purposes. … [W]e need a conception of semantic reference that will super-
vene on use and help explain features of usage (for example, agreement, 
disagreement, correction). Basing semantic reference on speaker-reference 
is the most straightforward, and perhaps the only, way to achieve this. 
Speaker-reference can be theoretically described without any theoretical 
commitment to semantic reference, so the supervenience relation has a re-
ductive character. Much work has been done, and much remains to be done, 
to sort out what the supervenience relation should be based on. Here I give 
a trio of possibilities (convention, stability, normalization); a determinate 
thesis would need to choose from among them, and also clarify the preferred 
option. (209)
20 For some early criticism of Grice’s claim, see Black 1973, Biro 1979, and Yu 
1979. For a defence of it, Suppes 1986.
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But, let us fi nally ask, is the Gricean project really something that 
should be pursued? More specifi cally, can Kripke’s speaker’s reference 
be used to explain semantic reference? On the face of it, the answer to 
the latter question should be a round “No.” As we saw in the preceding 
Section, in fact, according to Kripke’s defi nition a speaker cannot refer 
to b by using a designator c if he or she does not believe of b that it is 
the semantic referent of c. But, in order to believe of something that it 
is the semantic referent of something else, of course the speaker needs 
to have the concept of semantic reference. Since it is scarcely imagin-
able that one has this concept without there being semantic reference, 
we must then conclude that speaker’s reference presupposes semantic 
reference: the second clause in Kripke’s defi nition rules out the pos-
sibility of explaining the latter in terms of the former (and this, let me 
add, renders Kripke’s distinction much less Gricean than he himself 
alleged it was).21 In a nutshell: according to Kripke’s defi nition there 
could not be speaker’s reference if there were not semantic reference.
4. Devitt’s causal theory of proper names 
We have reached the conclusion that Kripke’s defi nition of speaker’s 
reference rules out the interpretation of his distinction amounting to 
endorsing what I have called the Gricean project, which is the most 
promising, if not the only, way to use the distinction to claim that refer-
ence comes in two different sorts, and that as a consequence our initial 
question should be given a positive answer. However, there is still an 
option that we have to discuss. Those who for whatever reasons (for 
example, because they sympathize with Grice’s general approach to 
language) believe that something like the Gricean project must be on 
the right track, might insist that Kripke was onto something impor-
tant when he introduced the notion of speaker’s reference, but that 
his defi nition of it was inadequate. They might even support the latter 
claim by voicing some independent doubts about the second clause of 
Kripke’s defi nition, noting that it over-intellectualizes the speech act 
of referring. According to the defi nition, in fact, in order to refer to 
something one needs to have fairly sophisticated semantic beliefs. It 
is quite implausible that children have such beliefs, but it is no less 
21 I fi rst noted that Kripke made speaker’s reference “parasitic” on semantic 
reference in Bianchi 2011: 277. See also Bianchi and Bonanini 2014: 182, and 
Bianchi forthcoming. Peter Hanks has recently made exactly the same point. As he 
writes, Kripke “defi nes the notion of speaker reference partly in terms of the notion 
of semantic reference” (2019: 14). Therefore, “[i]f Kripke is right, and the concept 
of semantic reference fi gures crucially in the defi nition of speaker reference, then 
it cannot be that speaker reference is somehow prior to semantic reference” (ibid.). 
Much earlier, Rod Bertolet noted some tension between Grice’s framework and 
Kripke’s distinction (“There is … no easy assimilation of the example Kripke discusses 
to Grice’s distinction between what a speaker’s words mean and what he means by 
them or in saying them” (1981: 72)), but the reasons he offered are quite different.
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implausible that they are not able to refer.22 Moreover, this seems to be 
in stark contrast with the picture of reference Kripke himself offered in 
“Naming and Necessity”—referring is easy: to succeed in it we do not 
need to know, or even believe, anything about what we are referring 
to, but only to be connected with it by means of an appropriate chain 
of communication—and with the assumption he implicitly makes in 
the article in which he gives his defi nition that every time one uses a 
designator to assert something he or she is referring (even though in 
the large majority of cases the speaker’s referent coincides with the 
semantic referent of the designator).23
Although to my knowledge nobody has ever explicitly stated the 
option just outlined, I believe that, upon refl ection, quite a lot of phi-
losophers would be ready to subscribe to it. In the passage quoted in 
the preceding Section, for example, Sainsbury writes that “[s]peaker-
reference can be theoretically described without any theoretical com-
mitment to semantic reference,” which is not something that anyone 
accepting Kripke’s defi nition could say. In this Section, I shall focus on 
Devitt’s causal theory of proper names, which may be taken as a way 
of articulating the option within a rich, naturalistic, framework. As we 
shall see, without discussing Kripke’s, Devitt offers a different defi ni-
tion of speaker’s reference (in his terms, speaker-designation), which 
does not appeal to (beliefs about) semantic reference.24 Before start-
ing my examination, however, I would like to highlight something that 
more or less follows from what I have said so far but could be missed 
by someone who approaches Devitt’s theory without paying due atten-
tion to the details of Kripke’s distinction. Devitt, like anyone else who 
pursues the Gricean project, puts the notion Kripke introduced to a 
novel use, a use that was not amongst those Kripke was thinking of. 
Because of this, to make the notion acceptable he cannot simply appeal 
to intuitions concerning cases such as the Smith-Jones one. In fact, 
these intuitions at most justify the introduction of a notion defi ned as 
Kripke did, where a belief about semantic reference plays a crucial role, 
and, as we saw, a notion so defi ned cannot play the explanatory role 
Devitt wished it to play. Thus, Devitt needs to vindicate his distinction 
between speaker’s reference and semantic reference in a different way.
Devitt’s causal theory of proper names makes its fi rst appearance 
in print in “Singular Terms,” an article that draws from his PhD dis-
sertation and is published in 1974, after “Naming and Necessity”, the 
avowed source of inspiration, but before the article where Kripke elabo-
rates on the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic refer-
22 This objection is hinted at in Devitt 1981a: 513.
23 Perhaps, Kripke might reply by noting that there is a sense according to which, 
for any designator “a” we have in our lexicon, we may be said to believe that a is the 
semantic referent of “a.” Even if this were true, however, it would not allow him to 
account for cases involving children where the speaker’s referent seemingly diverges 
from the semantic referent.
24 For yet another defi nition, more Gricean in that, unlike Devitt’s, it is couched 
in terms of intentions (it appeals to the notion of intending to direct someone’s 
attention to something), see Bertolet 1987.
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ence. Interestingly, in “Singular Terms” Devitt does not draw any such 
distinction. On the contrary, he offers a unitary account of reference (in 
his terms, designation). As I have argued elsewhere, this account is more 
Donnellanian than Kripkean, in that it explains proper name reference in 
terms of having in mind (“We can say roughly … that a name token des-
ignates an object if and only if the speaker had the object in mind (meant 
the object) in uttering the token” (1974: 189)), where having an object in 
mind is explained not in terms of having (identifying) knowledge, as done 
by those philosophers who adopt the principle of identifying descriptions, 
but causally (“one has an object in mind in virtue of a causal connection 
between one’s state of mind and the object” (188; see also Devitt 1976: 
409–10). Note, incidentally, that this implies a straight positive answer to 
our initial question: as in Donnellan’s historical explanation theory and 
in the neo-Donnellanians’ accounts, according to the fi rst formulation of 
Devitt’s causal theory the mind of the speaker directly determines the 
reference of the proper name tokens he or she produces.25
Only in his book Designation does Devitt introduce into his frame-
work a distinction similar, but, importantly, not identical, to Kripke’s. 
After a fi rst outline of his causal theory of designation, which resembles 
the one proposed in the 1974 article, Devitt embarks on a defence of the 
language of thought hypothesis, and relates it to “a Gricean distinction 
between speaker meaning and conventional meaning” (1981b: 80):
Consider an utterance. In my view, what the speaker means by the token he 
utters is determined by the meaning of the thought that causally underlies 
his utterance. On the other hand, the conventional meaning of the token in 
a community is determined by what a member of that community using a 
token of that physical type would commonly mean and be taken to mean. 
What he would commonly mean and be taken to mean depends in some way 
on what people have commonly meant by words of that physical type and by 
sentences of that structure. (80)
Like Kripke, then, Devitt starts from Grice’s approach to mean-
ing. Contrary to Kripke, however, he explicitly subscribes to Grice’s 
claim that word and sentence meaning should be explained in terms of 
speaker meaning (although not to the further one that speaker mean-
ing should be explained in terms of intentions): “I explain conventional 
meaning in terms of speaker meaning and speaker meaning in terms 
of thought meaning” (80).26 Note, also, that in Devitt’s hands, Grice’s 
sentence (word, expression) meaning has become conventional mean-
ing: the explanandum is now a conventionally determined property of 
linguistic tokens (compare footnote 19 above).
25 I elaborate on these issues in Bianchi forthcoming. See Devitt forthcoming a 
for some discussion.
26 See also Devitt 1981a: 519: “We seem to need notions of speaker meaning 
that enable us to explain conventional meaning. It seems that conventional meaning 
must be built up in some way from common speaker meanings.” For a recent general 
defence of this approach, see Devitt forthcoming b: chap. 3.
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Unfortunately, I cannot examine Devitt’s Gricean account of mean-
ing in its full generality here and I shall have to limit myself to discuss-
ing and criticizing his causal theory of proper name reference, which 
rests against that background. I believe that if what I shall say about 
it is on the right track, something should be readjusted in the back-
ground as well—the relationships between mind and language are not 
that simple!—but I shall not argue in favor of this here.
In a recent article—his latest revisiting of his causal theory of prop-
er names—Devitt offers the following defi nitions (“biconditionals”) for 
(proper name) speaker’s reference and semantic reference:
Speaker-Designation: A designational name token speaker-designates an 
object if and only if all the designating-chains underlying the token are 
grounded in the object. (2015: 125)
Conventional-Designation: A designational name token conventionally-des-
ignates an object if and only if the speaker, in producing the token, is par-
ticipating in a convention of speaker-designating that object, and no other 
object, with name tokens of that type. (126)
Let us begin by noting that the defi nition of semantic reference ap-
peals explicitly to speaker’s reference. For a proper name token to re-
fer, in fact, the speaker who produced it must be participating in a 
(pre-existing, I assume) convention of speaker’s referring to something 
by using that name. Thus, there could not be semantic reference (con-
ventional-designation) if there were not speaker’s reference (speaker-
designation): Devitt is clearly pursuing the Gricean project.
Given this, the fi rst thing that we have to check is whether, unlike 
Kripke’s, Devitt’s notion of speaker’s reference can indeed be used to 
defi ne semantic reference in a non-circular way. The fact that the no-
tion is defi ned in terms of “designating-chains” could lead one to believe 
that it cannot be so used, since the word “designating” in “designat-
ing-chain” might induce the suspicion that designating-chains involve 
(past) semantic reference (conventional-designation). Here, however, 
appearances are misleading.
Designating-chains are introduced by Devitt in Designation in the 
following way:
“underlying” a name token is a “causal chain” “accessible to” the person who 
produced the token. That chain, like the ability that partly constitutes it, is 
“grounded in” the object the name designates…. I shall call such a causal 
chain a … “designating-chain.” (1981b: 29)
They are thus characterized: “D[esignating]-chains consist of three dif-
ferent kinds of link: groundings which link the chain to an object, abili-
ties to designate, and communication situations in which abilities are 
passed on or reinforced (reference borrowings)” (1981b: 64; 2015: 110). 
What is important to note for our present purposes is that designating-
chains underlying a proper name token do not necessarily originate in 
a baptism or something like that, and do not require what Devitt calls 
“reference borrowings.” For example, in the Smith-Jones case, there 
is, according to Devitt, a designating-chain underlying the “Jones” to-
kens produced by the speakers in their colloquy originating in their 
perception of Smith, although there is another one originating in Jones’ 
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baptism.27 Hence, some designating-chains do involve (past) semantic 
reference, but some do not, and this suffi ces to avoid circularity, as De-
vitt himself notes in Designation:
Conventions are explained in terms of speaker meanings. Speaker mean-
ings are explained in terms of thought meanings. Thought meanings are 
partly explained in terms of conventions. We seemed to have a circle. What 
we really have is more like a spiral, a spiral that starts from crude thought 
meanings. (1981b: 85)
Thus, we may conclude that unlike Kripke’s, Devitt’s notion of 
speaker’s reference can indeed be used to explain semantic reference. 
The remaining, crucial, question is obviously whether the resulting ex-
planation is a good one. To answer, we need to better examine the two 
defi nitions Devitt offers.
Devitt’s account of speaker’s reference is very similar to his “Singu-
lar Terms” account of reference tout court, hence to Donnellan’s histori-
cal explanation theory and to the neo-Donnellanian accounts, as Devitt 
himself recognizes, although with some reservations concerning Don-
nellan (see Devitt forthcoming a). Basically, it is an account of the state 
of mind leading to the production of a proper name token, or, as Devitt 
also likes to say, of the thought the speaker is expressing by the to-
ken, as the following comment to an example clearly shows: “The token 
[speaker-]designated that person in virtue of being immediately caused 
by a thought that is grounded in that person by a designating-chain” 
(2015: 111). In fact, Devitt’s causal theory of speaker’s reference bears 
one of the extreme consequences of Donnellan’s historical explanation 
theory: once one has a thought about an individual, he or she can ex-
press the former and (speaker-)refer to the latter by whatever name he 
or she wants.28 The token he or she then produces (speaker)-refers to 
the individual the thought is about, no matter how that individual was 
baptized and what any preceding tokens of the same name referred to:
A person can, of course, speaker-designate an object by a name without 
there being any convention of so doing. All that is required is that a token 
of the name have underlying it a designating-chain grounded in the object. 
So I could now speaker-designate Aristotle with any old name simply on the 
strength of the link to Aristotle that is constitutive of my ability to desig-
nate him by ‘Aristotle.’ (2015: 120)
The main difference between Devitt’s view in Designation (and later 
articles) and his preceding (as well as Donnellan’s and the neo-Donnel-
lanians’) view is that he does not claim any more that the state of mind 
leading to the production of a proper name token, or the thought the 
speaker expresses by the token, determines what the token semanti-
cally refers to. For a proper name token to semantically refer to some-
thing, in fact, the speaker producing it must be participating in a con-
vention of speaker-referring to it with tokens of that type, as Devitt’s 
27 This is why, according to Devitt (see footnote 9 above), those tokens partially 
speaker-refer to Smith and partially speaker-refer to Jones.
28 For more elaboration on this, see Bianchi forthcoming.
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defi nition of semantic reference (Conventional-Designation) states. No 
convention, no semantic reference.
What about Devitt’s account of speaker’s reference? I must confess I 
do not have much against it, except that I do not consider it an account 
of … reference, of any sort. As I said, it is an account of the state of mind 
leading to the production of a proper name token, or of the thought the 
speaker is expressing by the token. More specifi cally, it is a causal ac-
count of that state of mind’s, or of that thought’s, aboutness. Now, that 
aboutness is to be accounted for in causal terms is something I whole-
heartedly agree with. I am also quite comfortable with the so-called 
representational theory of mind, and with the language of thought hy-
pothesis, which provide the theoretical background to Devitt’s causal 
account.29 One minor perplexity I have concerns Devitt’s apparent 
identifi cation of the (complex) state of mind leading to the production of 
a proper name token with the thought the speaker expresses with the 
token. A consequence of this is Devitt’s idea that there can be partial 
speaker’s reference.30 Consider the Smith-Jones case once again. As we 
have already seen, Devitt claims that “[b]ecause there are d-chains to 
both Jones and Smith, … neither was the speaker’s referent but each 
was his partial referent” (1981a: 515). While I agree that the (com-
plex) state of mind leading to the speaker’s production of that token of 
“Jones” concerned both Jones and Smith, I fi nd it more natural to say 
that the thought he expressed on that occasion was only about Jones, 
although it was brought about by a number of other thoughts of his, 
some of which were (fully) about Jones and some of which were (fully) 
about Smith. But this is perhaps only a verbal disagreement, and in 
any case it does not bear directly on the issues I am interested in here.
My main point, as I suggested, is simply that Devitt’s speaker’s ref-
erence does not seem to have much to do with reference. Devitt’s is 
an account of the state of mind leading to the production of a proper 
name token, and as such can help explain language use. For example, 
it can help explain why, in the Smith-Jones case, the two speakers 
use the name “Jones” when they see Smith in the distance raking the 
leaves (note, however, that the explanation also needs to appeal to the 
fact that Jones is the semantic referent of “Jones”). But how does all 
this relate to proper name reference, if we assume, as Devitt does, that 
Kripke’s chain of communication picture is on the right track?
Of course, we already know Devitt’s answer. He is pursuing the 
Gricean project, hence he aims at explaining proper name semantic 
reference in terms of what he calls “speaker’s reference.” The specifi c 
29 For my endorsement of (a peculiar version of) the representational theory 
of mind and the language of thought hypothesis, see Bianchi 2005 and 2007. The 
version is peculiar in that it takes the language of thought to be the language we 
speak (cf. Field 1978 and 2001). In Designation, Devitt himself came very close to 
embracing it (1981b: 75–9). My endorsement of it partly explains my resistance to 
the idea that thought aboutness explains semantic reference (it is the other way 
around!) However, my criticisms below of Devitt’s account of proper name semantic 
reference (and, more generally, of the Gricean project) are independent of this.
30 For an early criticism of Devitt’s idea of partial reference, see McKinsey 1976.
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form of this explanation is indicated in Devitt’s defi nition of semantic 
reference (Conventional-Designation): a proper name token semanti-
cally refers to an object if and only if the speaker, in producing the to-
ken, is participating in a convention of speaker-referring to that object, 
and no other object, with name tokens of that type. Thus, according to 
Devitt there could not be (proper name) semantic reference if there were 
not conventions of speaker-referring, in which the producers of proper 
name tokens participate. But, is this really what we should say about 
proper name semantic reference, if we assume that Kripke’s chain of 
communication picture is on the right track?
Consider the famous passage where Kripke introduces his picture 
in the second lecture of “Naming and Necessity”:
Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. 
They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through vari-
ous sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. A 
speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say Rich-
ard Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to Richard 
Feynman even though he can’t remember from whom he fi rst heard of Feyn-
man or from whom he ever heard of Feynman. He knows that Feynman was 
a famous physicist. A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately 
to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring to Feynman 
even though he can’t identify him uniquely. He doesn’t know what a Feyn-
man diagram is, he doesn’t know what the Feynman theory of pair produc-
tion and annihilation is. Not only that: he’d have trouble distinguishing 
between Gell-Mann and Feynman. So he doesn’t have to know these things, 
but, instead, a chain of communication going back to Feynman himself has 
been established, by virtue of his membership in a community which passed 
the name on from link to link, not by a ceremony that he makes in private in 
his study: ‘By “Feynman” I shall mean the man who did such and such and 
such and such’. (1972: 298–9 (1980: 91–2))
I take this to be a picture of how proper names semantically work (as 
we saw in Section 2, in “Naming and Necessity” Kripke also introduces 
his distinction, but he was certainly not aiming at providing a picture 
of speaker’s reference in the second lecture). But note that in the pic-
ture, no mention is made either of speaker’s reference or of conven-
tions, even less, of course, of conventions of speaker-referring. Much 
more simply, a name come to be introduced by someone for something, 
after which it is spread around through use. And even if one wished to 
see in this spread the establishment of a convention, he or she should 
acknowledge that according to Kripke’s picture proper name tokens al-
ready (semantically!) refer before the convention gets established. The 
fact is that semantic reference, at least as far as proper names are con-
cerned, is basically a historical relation. Kripke himself summarizes 
the point in the following way:
In general our reference depends not just on what we think ourselves, but 
on other people in the community, the history of how the name reached one, 
and things like that. It is by following such a history that one gets to the 
reference. (1972: 301 (1980: 95))
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Let me note, by the way, that one almost immediate consequence 
of Kripke’s picture is that the reference of a proper name is not de-
termined or fi xed anew every time a token of it is produced. On the 
contrary, any token of it, except for the fi rst, inherits its reference 
from preceding ones, to which it is historically connected. Again, no 
speaker’s reference, and no participation in a convention of speaker-
referring, seem to be involved in this.
Now, as Kripke himself admits, his characterization is “far less spe-
cifi c than a real set of necessary and suffi cient conditions for reference 
would be” (1972: 300 (1980: 93)). To develop his picture into a defi nition 
of proper name semantic reference, many details need to be fi lled in, 
and many problems settled.31 Thus, Devitt might sensibly argue that 
it is when we try to fi ll in the details and settle the problems that we 
realize that we have to appeal to speaker’s reference and conventions 
of speaker-referring. But is it really so?
Consider the introduction of a name—in Devitt’s terms, reference 
fi xing—fi rst. Devitt might argue that it requires what he calls “speak-
er-designation”: to introduce a name for something, one must speaker-
refer to it with the name. Which means, roughly, that the introduction 
must be “immediately caused by a thought that is grounded in [it] by 
a designating-chain”—the state of mind leading to the production of 
the ‘introductory’ token must be about the individual that gets named. 
Now, there is no doubt that standard name introductions involve a lot 
of mental goings-on in the introducer(s)’s minds, and I have no dif-
fi culty in conceding that very often the individual that gets named 
is the one speaker-referred to, in Devitt’s sense. But is it always so? 
Reference fi xing is a complex phenomenon, with various factors often 
playing a role.32 I take it to be possible for a name to be introduced for 
something that is not speaker-referred to by the introducer(s), or for a 
name to be introduced without any speaker’s reference being made, or 
even without any mental goings-on taking place—couldn’t some sort of 
sophisticated machine mechanically and more or less randomly assign 
names? What is important in Kripke’s picture of proper name semantic 
reference, I would like to say, is that a name is introduced—a relation 
between a name and an individual is established—not how the name is 
introduced—how the relation is established.
Consider next the spread of a name after its introduction—in De-
vitt’s terms, reference borrowing. Devitt might argue that it requires 
conventions of speaker-referring: to semantically refer to something 
with a token of an already introduced name for that something, one 
must participate in a convention of speaker-referring to it with name to-
kens of that type. Now, I have nothing against talking of conventions in 
this case, provided only that one admits ‘infra-personal’ conventions—
31 Notable among the latter is, of course, the one raised by Evans with the 
Madagascar case, which we mentioned in Section 3.
32 See Martí 2015: 86–89 for some converging considerations.
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conventions that do not involve other people.33 But are they really con-
ventions concerning speaker’s reference (or, as Devitt also likes to say, 
conventions regarding the expression of thoughts)? And for a name to-
ken to semantically refer to something, is it really necessary that it be 
produced by someone who is participating in such a convention? Accord-
ing to Devitt, “[p]articipating in a convention [of such a kind] concerns 
the process of a speaker using the name because she has a disposition, 
dependent on the dispositions of others, to use it to express thoughts 
grounded in a certain object” (2015: 126). But, nowadays many semanti-
cally referring name tokens are literally produced by copying machines. 
Do these machines really have any disposition to express thoughts? 
Again, what is important in Kripke’s picture is that most proper name 
tokens semantically refer in virtue of a certain historical connection 
they have with other tokens of the same name. It may be diffi cult to 
say exactly what this historical connection amounts to (for my attempt, 
which uses Kaplan’s (1990) notion of repetition, see Bianchi 2015), but 
appealing to conventions of speaker-referring seems to me a false step.
Of course, much more than this needs to be said about both refer-
ence fi xing and reference borrowing, but even these scattered consid-
erations seem to me to cast a dark shadow on Devitt’s explanation of 
proper name semantic reference in terms of speaker’s reference. Those 
who believe that Kripke’s chain of communication picture is on the 
right track, as Devitt and I certainly do, should rather abandon the 
Gricean project.
5. Conclusion
Let me recapitulate. In this paper, I have critically examined the distinc-
tion between speaker’s reference and semantic reference, a distinction 
that was introduced in the philosophical debate by Kripke in the Seven-
ties and is now taken for granted by most philosophers of language. I 
fi rst focused on Kripke’s defi nition of speaker’s reference, and used the 
example of the structurally similar defi nition of traveler’s going to argue 
that it does not justify the claim that reference comes in two different 
sorts. Then, I briefl y considered the theoretical roles the notion of speak-
er’s reference is supposed to play. According to Kripke, in fact, the notion 
has both a critical and a constructive use. From the critical point of view, 
it can serve as a “tool to block postulation of unwarranted ambiguities”; 
from the constructive one, it can help explain the puzzling phenomenon 
of reference change. But a quick look at how the notion would play these 
theoretical roles reinforced my doubts about the claim that reference 
comes in two different sorts. Finally, I took a closer look at another ma-
jor role many philosophers assign to speaker’s reference, that of con-
tributing to the explanation of semantic reference. Interpreting Kripke’s 
distinction in this way amounts to endorsing what I have called, for ob-
33 For the reasons of this proviso, see footnote 1, footnote 19, and especially Martí 
2015: 89–91.
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vious reasons, the Gricean project. The Gricean project is in fact the 
most promising, if not the only, way to use Kripke’s distinction to claim 
that reference comes in two different sorts. Concerning this, however, I 
fi rst noted that Kripke’s defi nition of speaker’s reference makes the no-
tion incompatible with the project: since speaker’s reference is defi ned 
in terms of semantic reference, it cannot be used to explain it. Then, I 
examined Devitt’s causal theory of proper names, which offers a detailed 
account of both speaker’s and semantic reference. Devitt explicitly pur-
sues the Gricean project: unlike Kripke, he defi nes speaker’s reference 
without appealing to semantic reference, and then explains the latter 
in terms of the former. However, I argued that there is at least some 
tension between this explanation and Kripke’s chain of communication 
picture, a picture Devitt’s causal theory was meant to develop.
My tentative conclusion is that those philosophers who believe 
Kripke’s chain of communication picture is on the right track, as many 
do nowadays, should abandon the Gricean project, and with it the 
claim that reference comes in two different sorts. And perhaps, even 
the claim that the mind of the speaker plays a role in determining the 
reference of the proper name tokens he or she produces. If we stop 
distinguishing between speaker’s reference and semantic reference, we 
may hope to make some progress in our understanding of reference.34
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